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FIRST CIRCUIT
Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. SOL P.R. Ltd., No. 10-1200, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1568, 633 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Burford abstention doctrine, Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), applies to federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) citizen suits and requires the
district court to abstain from hearing the suit. Id. at *2.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis noting “the Burford
doctrine counsels abstention in situations where a federal suit will
interfere with a state administrative agency’s resolution of difficult and
consequential questions of state law or policy.” Id. at *12 n.9. The court
observed that although “the propriety of abstention from a RCRA citizen
suit is a matter of first impression in” the 1st Circuit, “[t]he majority of
courts to have considered it have found abstention . . . under Burford . . .
to be improper.”
Id. at *23. The court recognized “the strong
presumption in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction,” and it said that the
“Burford abstention must only apply in ‘unusual circumstances,’ when
federal review risks having the district court become the ‘regulatory
decision-making center.’” Id. at *22. In considering the doctrine’s
propriety here, the court considered “three factors: (1) the availability of
timely and adequate state-court review, (2) the potential that federal
court jurisdiction over the suit will interfere with state administrative
policymaking, and (3) whether conflict with state proceedings can be
avoided by careful management of the federal case.” Id. at *28. The
court had “significant concerns . . . about the timeliness of review offered
by commonwealth courts[.]” Id. at *29. The court proceeded, however,
with its analysis of the second and third factors and concluded that
abstention was inappropriate because the “threat that federal courts will
usurp the role of state administrative agencies . . .” does not exist in this
case. Id. at *30–31.
CONCLUSION: In light of the “intertwined state and federal
interests implicated by RCRA[]” and the unlikelihood of conflict with
state proceedings, the 1st Circuit found “this case to be an improper
candidate for Burford abstention.” Id. at *30–33.
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether the Erie Doctrine allows a federal court to
enforce state anti-SLAPP (strategic litigation against public
participation) statutes in federal proceedings. Id. at 81.
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ANALYSIS: The court first stated that generally, federal courts
sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal
procedural rules. Id. at 85. The court then observed that anti-SLAPP
statutes create a process by which a defendant can move to dismiss a
claim arising from the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to petition
with as little delay as possible. Id. at 81–82. In instances where statutes
govern both procedure and substance, courts must ask whether the
federal rule being replaced is sufficiently broad to control the issue in
front of the court. Id. Applying this analysis here, the court reasoned
Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which govern motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment,
are not broad enough to cover the issues within the scope of state antiSLAPP statutes. Id. at 88. The court said that Rules 12 and 56 were not
intended to occupy the entire field of pretrial procedure aimed at
eliminating meritless claims. Id. at 91. The court reasoned that because
neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56 “attempt to answer the same question” or
“address the same subject” as anti-SLAPP statutes, they can coexist. Id.
at 88.
The court further observed the “dual aims of Erie:
‘discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of laws[]’ . . . are best served by enforcement of [the state
anti-SLAPP statute] in federal court.” Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that federal courts sitting in
diversity jurisdiction must apply the state anti-SLAPP statute at issue.
Id. at 81.
Tasker v. DHL Ret. Sav. Plan, 621 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether a retirement plan and its administrators
“violated the anti-cutback rule when they eliminated [plaintiff’s]
unexercised option to transfer funds from [plaintiff’s] profit-sharing plan
account to [plaintiff’s] retirement plan.” Id. at 36.
ANALYSIS: The court analyzed the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) anti-cutback rule, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), and stated
that the Treasury Department “has carved a number of exceptions out of
the rule[]” under authority from Congress. Id. at 39. The court said the
regulations included “a clear grant of safe passage for plan amendments
that eliminate transfer options (even when the elimination may have the
incidental effect of reducing benefits).” Id. The court afforded “an
appreciable measure of judicial deference” to the Treasury regulations.
Id. The court declined to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation of other
regulations within ERISA, finding that the exception was a “highly
specific regulation that clearly and unambiguously permits the
elimination of a transfer option . . . .” Id. at 43.
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CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held “that the challenged plan
amendments were permissible and, therefore, the elimination of the
transfer options did not violate ERISA’s anti-cutback rule.” Id. at 44.
United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2010)
QUESTION ONE: “[W]hether federal criminal enforcement may be
used under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d), where certain federally approved state regulations as to
hazardous waste storage [covering more actors than corresponding
federal laws] have been violated.” Id. at 21.
ANALYSIS: The court first explained that the RCRA § 6926 allows
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to authorize state hazardous
waste programs in place of the federal program, so long as the state
program is “‘equivalent to’ and ‘consistent with’ the baseline federal
program[,]” which allows for federal enforcement of these state plans.
Id. at 25. It then observed, however, that parts of a state program greater
in scope than the federally required minimum are not considered part of
the federally approved program. Id. The court first said that “the EPA
has a statutory duty to approve state programs to the extent they meet the
statutory and regulatory criteria.” Id. at 28. The court went on to reject
the argument that the rule portion at issue is “a mere unenforceable
preamble[,]” noting that the rule is not divided into separate preamble
and rule sections. Id. Next, the court rejected the argument that “since
the baseline federal program does not require [certain parties] to obtain
hazardous waste storage permits, the United States cannot enforce state
rules that do[]”; this, the court said, “vitiates the clear distinction
between ‘more stringent’ and ‘greater in scope,’ collapsing the two terms
into one.” Id. at 29. Finally, the court did not agree that the rule at issue
was irrationally inconsistent with prior pronouncements by the EPA,
pointing out that these prior pronouncements were “internal guidance
documents[,]” which were not “promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking, and therefore cannot trump the agency’s formal
regulatory promulgations.” Id. at 30.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that state regulations which go
beyond the requirements of the federal baseline program under RCRA
are federally enforceable. Id. at 31.
QUESTION TWO: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), requiring that any fact
besides that of a prior conviction must be given to a jury if the fact
increases the penalty above the mandated statutory maximum, applies to
criminal fines. Id. at 32–33.
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ANALYSIS: In assessing whether the Apprendi decision applies to
criminal fines, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009), which stated, in dicta, that Apprendi
should not extend to criminal fines. Id. at 34. In Ice, the Court stated
that the Apprendi decision aimed at curtailing any “legislative attempt to
remove from the [province of the] jury the determination of facts that
warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.” Id. at 33 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court in Ice gave weight to the role of
judges at the time of America’s founding, when there was unfettered
judicial discretion to decide the specific criminal sanction at issue in the
case. Id. The Court in Ice further found that Apprendi was limited to
“the specific facts of the particular case.” Id. at 34 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Ice used this analysis when it stated that “[i]ntruding
Apprendi’s rule into decisions such as the imposition of statutorily
prescribed fines . . . surely would cut the rule loose from its moorings.”
Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit agreed with the dicta in Oregon v.
Ice, and held “Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines.” Id. at 34.
SECOND CIRCUIT
Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz LLP, No. 10-424, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
3512 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2011)
QUESTION: Whether a debt collector violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act’s (FDCPA) “judicial district” requirement by
bringing an action against a consumer in a city court with no jurisdiction
because the “consumer does not reside in that city or a town contiguous
thereto[,]” but also where the larger state-county court would have
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Id. at *3.
ANALYSIS: The court initially said the FDCPA requires debt
collectors to bring an action only in the “judicial district . . . (A) in which
such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or (B) in which such
consumer resides at the commencement of the action.” Id. at *7. After
finding no guidance in the statute’s plain language, the court looked to
the legal dictionaries at the time of the FDCPA’s enactment, defining
“judicial district” as “[o]ne of the circuits or precincts into which a state
is commonly divided for judicial purposes . . . .” Id. at *8–9. The court
continued by noting that it is clear that Congress intended “judicial
district” to refer to the “territorial subdivision of the courts,” but there is
no indication that Congress intended the term to refer to the federal court
system if a suit is brought in state court. Id. at *9–10.
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CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “the term ‘judicial
district,’ as applied to state-court debt collection actions, must be defined
in accordance with the judicial system of the state in which the debt
collection action is brought” and that here, it “extends no farther than the
boundaries of the city containing that court and the towns within the
same county that are contiguous by land thereto.” Id. at *10–11, *15.
Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “hearsay evidence may be considered by a
district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction.”
Id. at 52.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit stated that its sister circuits and lower
courts routinely consider hearsay evidence when determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction. Id. Citing the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the court said that, “[t]he admissibility of hearsay . . . goes to weight, not
preclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage[]” and that “[t]o hold
otherwise would be at odds with the summary nature of the remedy and
would undermine the ability of courts to provide timely provisional
relief.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a district court may
consider hearsay evidence in determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction. Id.
Parmalat Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 632 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.
2011)
QUESTION: What the proper standard is for determining “timely
adjudication” under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), which confers jurisdiction in
certain bankruptcy cases and proceedings. Id. at 79.
ANALYSIS: The court said that under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) a
district court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over liquidation
proceedings when the state court can adjudicate the claims in a timely
manner. Id. at 78. The court found that timeliness cannot be limited to a
fixed period of time; rather, it is specific to the case and situation and
should be viewed as the reasonable timeframe in which the respective
federal and state courts may resolve a given claim. Id. at 78–79. The
court stated “[a] court should therefore consider the backlog of the state
court’s calendar (if any) relative to the federal court’s calendar.” Id. at
79. In addition, the court stated that timeliness is determined by the
expertise of the court and the complexity of the issues involved. Id. The
court further reasoned that a court with greater legal expertise would not
necessarily always be the proper choice for timely adjudication,
especially if the case involved highly complex facts; instead, the court
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with better familiarity of the record would adjudicate the claims more
quickly. Id. The court determined that the nature of the underlying
bankruptcy proceeding is also relevant, because the level of urgency
differs depending on the interests involved. Id. Finally, the court found
“[a] matter cannot be timely adjudicated in state court if abstention and
remand of the state law claims will unduly prolong the administration [or
liquidation] of the estate.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that timeliness under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) is determined by four factors: (1) the respective
courts’ calendar backlog; (2) the complexity of issues and respective
expertise of the state and federal court; (3) the progression of the case;
and (4) the risk of prolonging the liquidation of the estate involved. Id.
at 78.
United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: What is the proper procedure “when a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is first raised in the district court prior to
the judgment of conviction.” Id. at 113.
ANALYSIS: The court determined that “[w]hen such a claim is
raised on direct appeal [a court] may choose to: (1) decline to hear the
claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent
28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition; (2) remand the claim to the district for
necessary fact-finding; or (3) decide the claim on the record before [the
court].” Id. at 112–13. The court observed that when this claim is first
raised on direct review of conviction, “it is often preferable for the court
to decline to consider the claim, awaiting its presentation in a collateral
proceeding.” Id. at 112. The court reasoned that collateral review
generally provides a better opportunity for the court to evaluate an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim than direct review because the
factual record can be developed by the district court. Id. The court was
“perplexed by the assertion” that the district court must “require a
defendant to use his one § 2255 motion to raise an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim post-judgment, particularly when the district court is in
a position to take evidence, if required, and to decide the issue prejudgment.” Id. at 113. The court further reasoned that “[t]he decision to
interrupt the prejudgment proceedings to inquire into the merits of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may depend on, among other
things, whether the court need to relieve the defendant’s attorney, or in
any event, to appoint new counsel in order to properly adjudicate the
merits of the claim.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that a district court may, and at
times must, consider an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to
the judgment of conviction. Id.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Attorney General of the U.S., 625 F.3d 782 (3d
Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “conditional parole under § 236 [of the
Immigration and Nationality Act] constitute[s] parole into the United
States for the purposes of adjustment of status [to that of lawfully
admitted permanent resident] under § 245.” Id. at 786.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with a case with
“substantially similar facts” heard before the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), holding “‘conditional parole’ under [§] 236(a)(2)(B) is a
distinct and different procedure from ‘parole’ under [§] 212(d)(5)(A) and
that the respondent is not eligible to adjust his status under [§] 245(a)
based on his conditional parole.” Id. The court first “analyze[d] the
BIA’s interpretation of the statutes for reasonableness[,]” “[b]ecause
there is no clear, unambiguously expressed intent of Congress that
speaks directly . . . to the precise question at issue.” Id. The court said
that “the language of the adjustment provision in § 245(a) refers
specifically to ‘parole[d] into the United States[,]’” and “[i]t is
reasonable to interpret the statute to allow aliens to adjust status if they
were ‘parole[d] in the United States’ . . . but not if they were released on
‘conditional parole.’” Id. The court then explained that “the history of
the statute suggests that Congress sought to limit the universe of those
who could adjust status to aliens whose admission was ‘for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit’ as set forth in §
212(d)(5)(A).” Id. The court reasoned “[t]o allow aliens released on
conditional parole under § 236 to adjust status under § 245 would
frustrate Congress’s intention to limit eligibility to refugees whose
admission provides a public benefit or serves an urgent humanitarian
purpose.” Id. at 787.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the “examination of the
statute confirms the BIA’s interpretation – ‘parole into the United States’
is not the same as ‘conditional parole,’” and thus aliens “are not eligible
to adjust status under § 245 because of their § 236 conditional parole.”
Id. at 786, 787.
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Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether a police officer’s reliance on legal advice
from an assistant district attorney prior to making an arrest entitles the
officer to qualified immunity in civil suits. Id. at 251.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis by stating that “[t]he
qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments
by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Id. at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court explained, although no precedent existed that was directly on point,
the Supreme Court had “considered a police officer’s entitlement to
qualified immunity when he applied for an arrest warrant that was
approved by a magistrate but later found to lack probable cause.” Id.
The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a warrant “did not
automatically shield the officer[,]” and that if “no reasonably competent
officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue[,]” there would
be no immunity. Id. This court drew a parallel between an officer
seeking issuance of an arrest warrant and an officer requesting legal
advice prior to making an arrest. Id. at 255.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held “that a police officer who relies
in good faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted
under the law is presumptively entitled to qualified immunity from
Fourth Amendment claims premised on a lack of probable cause[,]” but
the officer’s reliance must be objectively reasonable and a plaintiff may
rebut the presumption by showing no reasonable officer would have
relied on the legal advice under the circumstances. Id. at 255–56.
Noel v. Boeing Co., No. 08-3877, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20217, 622
F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, under the [Fair Pay Act (FPA)], a failureto-promote claim constitutes ‘discrimination in compensation.’” Id. at
*15.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned “Congress’ motivation for enacting
the FPA was to overturn the perceived harshness of [Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)] and to provide
greater protection against wage discrimination but not other types of
employment discrimination.” Id. at *17. The court explained that this
intention was evident based on “Congress’ use of the term
‘compensation,’ repeated five times throughout the Act, indicating that
the driving force behind the FPA was remedying wage discrimination.”
Id. The court further reasoned that the FPA states that “[f]or purposes of
this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to
discrimination in compensation in violation of this subchapter, when a
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discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted.” Id.
at *18. The court said the textual analysis was “reinforced by [its]
treatment of compensation-related claims and failure-to-promote claims
as distinct grievances that are not coextensive.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a “failure-to-promote
claim is not a discrimination-in-compensation charge within the meaning
of the FPA[.]” Id. at *23.
United States v. Manzo, No. 10-2489, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3113 (3d.
Cir. Feb. 17, 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an unsuccessful candidate for public office
can attempt or conspire to obtain property from another with that
person’s consent induced under color of official right within meaning of
the Hobbs Act.” Id. at *7.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the plain language of the
Hobbs Act, but determined that the scope of the phrase “under color of
official right” was not apparent from the plain language of the statute.
Id. at *9–10. The court then determined that, under the common law, the
phrase “‘under color of official right’ . . . encompassed only the actions
of public officials.” Id. at *12. The court reasoned that this
interpretation was consistent with congressional intent since Congress
was concerned with the coercive power inherent in public officials. Id. at
*19. From there, the court concluded that acting “under color of official
right” is a prerequisite element of a violation of the Hobbs Act,
regardless of whether the offense was inchoate or substantive. Id. at
*23–24. Since candidates for public office are not public officials, the
court reasoned that such a candidate cannot act “under color of official
right.” Id. at *32.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that an action “under color of
official right” is a prerequisite to liability for extortion under the Hobbs
Act, regardless of whether the alleged offense is inchoate or substantive,
and conduct by an unsuccessful candidate for public office does not
satisfy the prerequisite and therefore cannot be the basis for liability
under the Hobbs Act. Id. at *32–33.
United States v. Rebelo, 394 F. App’x 850 (3d Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether a “civil denaturalization action is time-barred
by the catch-all statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462,” which caps
the initiation of enforcement proceedings and penalties at five years. Id.
at 852.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that because the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) does not impose a statute of limitations on the
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government to initiate denaturalization proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2462
may be applicable if denaturalization is deemed a “penalty . . . or
forfeiture” within the purview of § 2462. Id. For guidance, the court
looked to precedent interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 791, § 2462’s predecessor,
noting this provision was substantially similar. Id. at 853. The court
reasoned that in order for § 2462 to apply, the government has to seek to
enforce a “penalty or forfeiture,” which has been defined by the Supreme
Court as “something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of
public law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here,
the court found that denaturalization served “as a remedy for citizenship
fraudulently obtained” and, therefore, is “regarded not as punishment but
as a necessary part of regulating naturalization of aliens.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that civil denaturalization is
not time-barred by the catch-all clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Id.
FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Clay, 627 F.3d 959 (4th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “walk-away escape from an unsecured facility
constitutes a qualifying crime of violence under [the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual] § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s Otherwise Clause[.]” Id. at 968.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the Armed Career Criminal
Act (the ACCA) and § 4B1.2(a)(2) defined “violent felony” in
substantively identical ways. Id. at 965. The court defined a “walk-away
escape” as an escape from an unsecured facility, without physically
removing any restraints or breaking any kind of security to escape. Id. at
969. The court then considered its sister courts’ holdings that a “walkaway escape from an unsecured facility is a distinct form of generic
conduct that does not involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct
that is roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed . . . to
the enumerated crimes of burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, or
crimes involving the use of explosives, and therefore, does not fall within
the Otherwise Clause . . .” of the ACCA or USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Finally, the court also
considered the Supreme Court’s holding that a failure to return to
custody is not violence under the ACCA, and it similarly reasoned that a
“walk-away escape from an unsecured facility is a far cry from the type
of conduct associated with the enumerated crimes . . .” in the ACCA. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that “the generic crime of
walk-away escape from an unsecured facility does not qualify as a crime
of violence under 4B1.2(a)(2)’s Otherwise Clause.” Id.
Wheeler v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2889 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the meaning of the term “compensation” in
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 922
(“LHWCA”) includes voluntary payments by an employer for medical
services provided to an employee. Id. at *7, 8.
ANALYSIS: In resolving the issue of whether the term
“compensation” within Section 22 of the LHWCA should be interpreted
to include “medical payments,” the court looked initially to the language
of the LHWCA itself. Id. at *8. The court said that the plain language
“does not clearly indicate that ‘compensation’ either includes or excludes
medical payments.” Id. at *9. In contrast, the court found that “other
provisions of the [LHWCA], by their text or structure, do clearly reflect
that the payment of medical benefits may, or may not, constitute
‘compensation.’” Id. Thus, the court concluded that the meaning of
“compensation” in Section 22 is ambiguous; therefore, the court “must
find the interpretation . . . most fairly . . . imbedded in the statute, in the
sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and the general
purposes that Congress manifested.” Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court reasoned that it “must interpret Section 22 in a way
so as to maintain the provision’s ‘extraordinarily broad’ modification
procedure . . . while still giving effect to the one-year limitations period it
contains.” Id. at *15 (citation omitted). The court emphasized that “the
legislative history of Section 22 reflects Congress’s attempt to strike such
a balance, and also supports the conclusion that ‘compensation’ in
Section 22 does not include payment of medical benefits.” Id. at 15–16.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit concluded that “interpreting
‘payment of compensation’ in Section 22 to exclude an employer’s
payment of medical benefits is most harmonious with the purpose of
both the statute’s limitations period and the [LHWCA] as a whole.” Id.
at 22.
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FIFTH CIRCUIT
Matthis v. Cain, 627 F.3d 1001 (5th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “the overturning and subsequent
reinstatement of a conviction on state post-conviction review destroys
the finality of a judgment for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(d)(1)(A)[.]”
Id. at 1003.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “[t]he language of
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) plainly refers to the date on which the ‘judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time
for seeking such review.’” Id. at 1003. The court reasoned that when the
language of a statute is plain, it must be enforced according to that plain
language. Id. The court determined that the language of the statute
distinguishes between direct review and post conviction review. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that there must be a conviction
that is overturned on direct review, and not on post-conviction review, to
destroy the finality of judgment. Id.
T.B. v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 628 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “Whether a parent of a child not yet determined to be a
‘child with a disability’ can recover attorneys’ fees under the [Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).]” Id. at 243.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “the plain language of the
IDEA’s fee-shifting provision limits recovery of attorneys’ fees to the
parent of a ‘child with a disability.’” Id. at 245. The court said that “just
because Congress has specifically extended some protections to children
not yet determined to meet the definition of ‘child with a disability’ does
not mean that it has extended all protections.” Id. The court further
reasoned that “regardless of the policy considerations and even if an
alternate version of the statute would better serve the goals of the IDEA,
that is a decision appropriately left to Congress, not to this court.” Id. at
246.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “attorneys’ fees are only
available in IDEA proceedings to a parent of a ‘child with a
disability[.]’” Id. at 245.
United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “Whether copying images to another device constitutes
‘production’” of child pornography for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
Id. at 189.
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ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the broad definition of
“production” in the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3), which includes
“producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or
advertising.” Id.
The court reasoned that the use of the word
“producing,” as well as other similar words in the definition,
demonstrates that Congress intended the statute to “cover a wider range
of conduct than merely initial production.” Id. The court next addressed
whether copying images fits within “reproduce” as contemplated in 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), rather than “produce” as used in §§ 2252(a)(3) and
(4). Id. at 190. The court explained that § 2252(a)(2) addresses one who
receives child pornography, while the other two sections address selling
and possessing child pornography. Id. The court furthered “[o]ne who
sells or possesses images may also produce them and thus could continue
to produce copies, but one who merely receives pornography could not
have been the original producer and thus may only reproduce.” Id.
Finally, the court stated the statute is not ambiguous and the rule of lenity
does not apply. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that copying images to another
device constitutes production of child pornography under § 2251(a). Id.
United States v. Hampton, No. 10-10035, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2427,
633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the phrase ‘term of supervised release
authorized by statute’ at the beginning of [18 U.S.C.]§ 3583(e)(3) caps
the aggregate amount of revocation imprisonment at the amount of
supervised release authorized by § 3583(b).” Id. at *7.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated “[§] 3583(e)(3) allows a court to
‘revoke a term of supervised release,’ and therefore, refers to one
particular revocation.” Id. at *8–9. The court then said the provision
“does not explicitly require the sentencing court to consider any previous
revocation imprisonment, and the only reference to a previous term of
supervised release is an instruction not to credit ‘time previously served
on postrelease supervision’ against the term of revocation
imprisonment.” Id. at *9. The court reasoned it would comport with the
rest of the statute and the provision’s history to hold that the language
“does not require aggregation of revocation imprisonment.” Id. at *9–
14. Finally, the court stated that the rule of lenity would not apply
because the language of the statute is not ambiguous. Id. at *20.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the “language at the
beginning of § 3583(e)(3) . . . does not require that court to credit the
defendant for prior terms of revocation imprisonment.” Id. at *8.
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United States v. Houston, 625 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “Whether the ‘except’ clause [of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i)] also covers a ‘greater minimum sentence’ for possession
of the same firearm during a subsequent crime committed later in the
same day.” Id. at 873.
ANALYSIS: The court first described a 2nd Circuit opinion
addressing a similar issue, the relationship between § 924(c) and an
additional consecutive sentence for possession of crack cocaine on two
separate occasions. Id. at 873–74. The court rejected the 2nd Circuit’s
“same transaction” test, which finds that the “except” clause of § 924(c)
applies only to “conduct arising from the same criminal transaction or set
of operative facts as the crime yielding the greater mandatory minimum
sentence.” Id. at 874, 873. The court reasoned that this approach
inaccurately equates the statutory language “during” and “in furtherance
of a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense[]” with “same
transaction” and “set of operative facts[.]” Id. at 874. Instead, the court
found that the statutory language “[more] reasonably refers only to
another, greater sentence for firearm possession, . . . so too does it most
reasonably refer only to a greater mandatory minimum sentence for that
specific crime of firearm possession.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)’s
reference to a ‘greater mandatory minimum sentence’ refers only to a
greater mandatory minimum for that specific offense.” Id. at 875.
United States v. Jasso, 634 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether district courts have the discretion to treat the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual as advisory when calculating
criminal history points. Id. at 308.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the Sentencing Guidelines
contain a safety valve provision, which permits sentencing judges to treat
minimum prison terms as advisory for certain low-level defendants,
provided that such defendants do not have more than one criminal
history point. Id. at 307–08. The court then reasoned that the language
of the Sentencing Guidelines does not give the sentencing court the
power to add or subtract criminal history points from the defendant’s
record. Id. at 308. The court further reasoned that a defendant with two
or more criminal history points is not eligible for relief under the safety
valve provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. The court also found
support by noting that “every court of appeals that has addressed this
argument” has held district courts do not have discretion to treat the
guidelines as advisory for this purpose. Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that district courts do not have
discretion to override the requirement of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual that defendants “not have more than [one] criminal history point
. . .” as a necessary condition for safety valve relief. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Jefferson, 623 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether a district court is instantly divested of
jurisdiction in favor of a court of appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 when a
timely appeal accompanied by the certification of the United States
Attorney “is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is
substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” Id. at 230
(internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS: The court first considered Supreme Court precedent
stating that the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 was “to remove all statutory
barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the
Constitution would permit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court also stated that the statute specifically provides it should be
“liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Furthermore, the court observed that the plain language
of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 limits it to evidentiary rulings that are “substantial
proof of a fact material in the proceeding” and not, as the district court
had found, rulings that involve elements of the charged offense. Id. at
230–31 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court reasoned
“the evaluation as to whether the evidence excluded by the district court
‘is substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding’ is to be made by
the United States Attorney, not the district court.” Id. at 231.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that a United States Attorney’s
certification stating that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay
and “that the evidence is substantial proof of a fact material in the
proceeding” is adequate to establish appellate jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3731. Id. at 231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), violates the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution “by requiring state
officials to administer federal law.” Id. at 918.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that, under the Tenth Amendment,
‘“Congress cannot compel the states to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program.’” Id. at 920. The court observed that SORNA
places restrictions on sex offenders, but it does not require states to
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comply with these restrictions. Id. Instead, under SORNA, Congress
permits a jurisdiction to comply with its requirements at its discretion,
but if it chooses not to do so then the jurisdiction will lose ten percent of
the federal funding allocated to criminal justice assistance. Id. The court
explained that the Tenth Amendment permits Congress to condition
federal funding on whether a state chooses to implement a federal
program. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that SORNA did not violate the
Tenth Amendment because it is “a valid exercise of Congress’s spending
power.” Id.
United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the terms “agreements and transactions” as set
forth in the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) encompass more than
just enforceable contracts so as to exclude them from the CEA. Id. at
182.
ANALYSIS: The court began by reiterating the plain language of the
statute, which articulates an exception for “agreements (including
transactions . . . commonly known to the trade as . . . [a] ‘bid’ or
‘offer[.]’)” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned
that although this was not a precise definition, it was sufficient for the
court to find that “agreements and transactions cover more than
enforceable contracts.” Id. The court further stated that the statute’s
reference to “transactions involving contracts” makes clear that
transactions and contracts are separate terms, and therefore suggests that
“transaction” does not merely refer to enforceable contracts. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court then looked to the ordinary
meaning of the word “transaction,” which is “‘[t]he act or an instance of
conducting business or other dealings; esp., the formation, performance,
or discharge of a contract.’” Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the term “transaction”
under the CEA was not limited to completed and enforceable contracts.
Id. at 182.
United States v. Sanchez-Ledezma, 630 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the “crime of evading arrest with a motor
vehicle . . .” under Texas Penal Code § 38.04(b)(1) is a “crime of
violence” and therefore subject to an aggravated felony enhancement
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Id. at
448.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that a prior decision analyzing
§ 38.04 as a “violent felony” under another statute was informative to the
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present issue. Id. In that case, the court determined “that fleeing by
vehicle is purposeful, violent, and aggressive.” Id. at 450. The court
reasoned the crime “require[d] intentional conduct[,]” “require[d]
disregarding an officer’s lawful order,” and “will typically lead to a
confrontation with the officer being disobeyed, a confrontation fraught
with risk of violence.” Id. at 450–51.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “evading arrest with a
motor vehicle is . . . a ‘crime of violence’ . . . and therefore an
‘aggravated felony’ . . .” to which the enhancement guideline properly
applies. Id. at 451.
SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Baird, 403 F. App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether in order to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 659, the
government must prove that the defendant “knew the goods . . . received,
purchased, or possessed were transiting in interstate commerce.” Id. at
63.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated 7th Circuit precedent on the issue:
“Congress designed the interstate commerce element of 18 U.S.C. § 659
merely to justify federal authority over the crime.” Id. The court
followed the 7th Circuit’s logic further: “[a] defendant does not need to
know that the stolen property that he received was stolen from an
interstate shipment[;]” rather, the defendant “need only know that the
property he received was stolen.” Id. Finding that the 2nd and 11th
Circuits also agreed with this reasoning, the court adopted this approach.
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “[a] substantive violation
of 18 U.S.C. [§] 659 does not require knowledge of the interstate or
foreign character of the goods.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Contents of Accounts, 629 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the exercise of preliminary injunctive relief
under [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65] to order the release of
seized property would be ‘inconsistent’ with the procedure set out in
[Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset
Forfeiture Actions Supplemental Rule G] for the release of seized
property, namely, a petition for release under [the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C.] § 983(f).” Id. at 606.
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ANALYSIS: The court stated as a threshold matter that injunctive
relief in civil forfeiture actions under CAFRA is “governed by the
Supplemental Rules and, to the extent they are not ‘inconsistent,’ the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. The court listed four factors
under Rule 65 that courts must consider when deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief. Id. The court then outlined the requirements that civil
claimants must demonstrate for release of seized property under CAFRA.
Id. at 607. Rejecting the argument that the Supplemental Rules or
§ 983(f) “expressly incorporate the Civil Rules,” the court stated that
§ 983(f) and Rule 65 are inconsistent for three reasons. Id. at 607–08.
First, § 983(f) is narrower; the factors of Rule 65 “not only differ from
those required under § 983(f), but are also merely factors to be balanced,
not prerequisites that must be met.” Id. at 608 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Second, the language of Supplemental Rule A states that
Supplemental Rule G “applies exclusively to [forfeiture actions, and] it is
only where [Supplemental Rule G] does not address an issue that the
Civil Rules set the procedure. . . .” Id. Finally, the legislative history
refutes the argument that § 983(f) merely supplements Rule 65. Id. at
608–09.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that Rule 65 was inconsistent
with, and inapplicable to a petition for release under, § 983; therefore,
preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65 is not available to civil
forfeiture claimants. Id. at 609.
United States v. Holcomb, 625 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether an escapee’s willingness to cooperate in
connection with the possibility of imminent arrest constitutes an
escapee’s “voluntary return” so as to entitle him to a downward
departure in his offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2P1.1(b)(2). Id. at 291.
ANALYSIS: The court began by looking at the language of the
application note stating that ‘“returned voluntarily’ includes voluntarily
returning to the institution or turning one’s self in to a law enforcement
authority as an escapee (not in connection with an arrest or other
charges).” Id. The court then reviewed decisions of the 7th, 8th, and 9th
Circuits that decided the issue, all of which decided that the risk of
imminent arrest renders an escapee’s return to be involuntary. Id. at
291–92.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “a willingness to cooperate
arising in connection with the possibility of imminent arrest is not the
type of voluntary behavior that U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(2)’s . . . downward
departure is intended to reward.” Id. at 292.
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United States v. LHC Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a violation of the sealing provisions
applicable to qui tam relators under the [False Claims Act (FCA)]
precludes recovery by the relator.” Id. at 296.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that in setting the FCA’s procedural
requirements, Congress “clearly identified the factors it found relevant
and considered the tension between them . . . .” Id. The court explained
that the purposes of qui tam actions “are balanced with law enforcement
needs . . . .” Id. The court further reasoned that since “the very existence
of the qui tam right to bring suit in the name of the Government is
created by statute, it is particularly appropriate to have the right exist in a
given case only with the preconditions that Congress deemed necessary
for the purpose of safeguarding the Government’s interests.” Id. at 298.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “violations of the
procedural requirements imposed on qui tam plaintiffs under the False
Claims Act preclude such plaintiffs from asserting qui tam status.” Id. at
296.
United States v. McNerney, No. 09-4011, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3870
(6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “only unique digital images, not duplicate
digital images, should be counted in computing an enhancement” under
U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(7) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at *6.
ANALYSIS: The court initially observed “§ 2G2.2(b)(7) was
properly enacted pursuant to explicit congressional mandate, and
congressional will should be considered in construing its parameters.”
Id. at *16. It then stated “that congressional directives regarding
sentencing for child pornography have consistently increased
penalties . . . [and] that although Congress has explicitly expressed its
desire to enhance punishments for child pornography offenses, Congress
has not differentiated between digital images and hard copy images for
the purposes of § 2G2.2(b)(7) image enumeration.” Id. at *16–17. The
court finally reasoned “[l]ike the congressional directive itself, the
Application Note to § 2G2.2(b)(7) is similarly devoid of any indication
that § 2G2.2(b)(7) differentiates between digital images and hard copy
images.” Id. at *17.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded “duplicate digital images,
like duplicate hard copy images, should be counted separately for
purposes of calculating a sentence enhancement pursuant to
§ 2G2.2(b)(7).” Id. at *23.
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Joren v. Napolitano, No. 10-1017, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2332 (7th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2011)
QUESTION: Whether “the [Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA)] prohibit[s] security screeners from successfully bringing
discrimination claims against the TSA under the Rehabilitation Act[.]”
Id. at *5.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that each circuit to address this
question, including the 2nd, 11th, and Federal Circuits, has concluded
“the plain language of the ATSA preempts application of the
Rehabilitation Act to security screeners.” Id. at *5–6. The court
highlighted the use of the word “notwithstanding” in the ATSA with
respect to its employment provisions, and it pointed out the Supreme
Court’s recognition of this language as a signal of “Congressional intent
to supersede conflicting provisions of . . . other statute[s].” Id. at 6. The
court then observed other circuits’ application of this logic and their
conclusion that Congress therefore intended to enhance the flexibility in
hiring screeners “without regard to the prohibitions against disability
discrimination in the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at *6–7.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit agreed with other circuits and held
that the ATSA preempts security screeners from successfully bringing
discrimination claims against the TSA under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
at *5–7.
SEC v. Wealth Mgmt., 628 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether a district court’s order affirming a receiver’s
asset distribution plan is reviewable on interlocutory appeal under the
collateral-order doctrine. Id. at 330.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit explained that the collateral-order
doctrine permits interlocutory review of orders that “conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the underlying action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. The 7th Circuit
determined that the order affirming the receiver’s asset distribution plan
met all three criteria because “it conclusively determine[d] how the
recovered assets in the receivership [would] be distributed[,]” “it [was]
important to the defrauded investors and [was] independent of the merits
of the underlying . . . enforcement action[,]” and it was “effectively
unreviewable after the court enter[ed] a final judgment because the assets
[would] have been distributed by that point.” Id. at 330–31. The court
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also stated that the 5th and 6th Circuits “have held that the collateralorder doctrine permits interlocutory review of a district-court order
approving a receiver’s plan of distribution.” Id. at 330.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held a receiver’s asset distribution
plan is reviewable on interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order
doctrine. Id.
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether evidence of a foreign national’s alienage and
lack of lawful status in the United States, obtained as a result of arrest
without probable cause, should be suppressed as an “egregious” violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 778.
ANALYSIS: Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the court said that in civil
deportation cases, evidence of one’s alienage must have been obtained
by an “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation in order for the
exclusionary rule to apply. Id. at 777–78. The court stated that “[w]hile
‘egregious’ violations are not limited to those of physical brutality . . .
Lopez-Mendoza requires more than a violation to justify exclusion.” Id.
at 778 (citation omitted). The court remarked that the Supreme Court
had found that “brutal conduct, which shocks the conscience and
offend[s] the community’s sense of fair play and decency, constitutes an
egregious constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). An allegation of arrest without probable cause, the court
stated, does not satisfy the “egregious” standard for evidentiary exclusion
in civil deportation cases under Lopez-Mendoza if there is no further
misconduct. Id. at 779.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that obtaining information as to
a person’s alienage and immigration status without evidence of
misconduct beyond an arrest without probable cause does not rise to an
egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the
information need not be excluded from evidence. Id.
United States v. Nash, 627 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether an adjudication under Minnesota’s Extended
Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) “followed by the revocation of probation and
execution of an adult sentence is a predicate conviction . . .” under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. at 695, 696.
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ANALYSIS: The court stated that a conviction is determined under
state law and that Minnesota courts have ruled that an adjudication under
the EJJ is a conviction. Id. The court said it is a conviction for purposes
of sentencing guidelines, and for mandatory minimum sentence statutes.
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that an “EJJ adjudication is an
adult conviction of a violent felony and thus is a predicate offense under
the ACCA.” Id.
NINTH CIRCUIT
Am. Cargo Transp., Inc. v. United States, 625 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir.
2010)
QUESTION: “Whether the United States has waived sovereign
immunity in connection with shipping under the Food for Peace program
. . . .” Id. at 1181.
ANALYSIS: The court began by noting “the waiver of sovereign
immunity applies only where a private party would be liable under
admiralty law for the same conduct.” Id. The court then looked at the
alleged wrong, which was that the government wrongfully refused a bid
in violation of the laws that regulate government conduct. Id. As these
acts only regulate government conduct, a private party could not be liable
under them. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the government had not
waived sovereign immunity because a private party is not regulated by,
and would not be liable under, laws that control only government
actions. Id. at 1182.
Battle Ground Plaza, LLC v. Ray, 624 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over
a collateral attack—based on a state breach of contract theory—on its
previous sale order, having already approved a Chapter 11 Plan,
including the sale of real property, closed the case, overseen payment of
creditors, and discharged the debtor.” Id. at 1127.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the language of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 157(a) and 1334, stating that the jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy
courts is very broad “but the exercise of their jurisdiction to enter any
final order or judgment is limited to” (1) cases “arising under” title 11;
(2) core bankruptcy proceedings “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code or
in a case under the Code; or (3) “cases in which all interested parties
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‘consent’ to the Bankruptcy court having final jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at
1130. Additionally, the court stated that bankruptcy courts retain
jurisdiction in “(1) ‘non-core’ proceedings that either ‘arise under’ the
Bankruptcy Code, ‘arise in’ a case under the Code, or ‘relate to’ a case
under the Code . . . ; or (2) ‘core’ proceedings that ‘relate to’ a case
under the Bankruptcy Code, but neither ‘arise under’ the Code nor ‘arise
in’ a case under the Code[.]” Id. Finally, the court said that a
bankruptcy court has ancillary jurisdiction, even without the “arising
under” element, where it is necessary (1) for a single court to decide
factually interdependent claims, or (2) to enable the bankruptcy court “to
vindicate its authority and effectuate its decrees.” Id. The court
reasoned that the “arise under” or “arise in” test requires that the matter
be unique to the Bankruptcy Code and cannot exist “outside of
bankruptcy and could not be brought in another forum,” and is therefore
not satisfied by breach of contract claims. Id. at 1131. Next, applying
the “related to” standard, the court determined that this inquiry is broader
but still requires a finding of “close nexus” between the matter and the
bankruptcy proceeding, and it is therefore similarly not satisfied by a
contract dispute. Id. at 1134–35. Finally, the court analyzed the breach
of contract claim to determine if there was ancillary jurisdiction and
concluded that the bankruptcy proceedings were entirely foreclosed. Id.
at 1136.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a bankruptcy court does
not retain jurisdiction over a collateral attack based on a state law breach
of contract claim. Id.
Collins v. Gee W. Seattle L.L.C., 631 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether an employee is considered to have
“voluntarily departed” within the meaning of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act when the employee leaves a job
because a business is closing. Id. at 1002–03.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated that the employers’ argument, that
employees who voluntarily left their jobs because of the closing of the
business did not experience “employment loss,” is “inconsistent with the
basic structure of the WARN Act and frustrates its purposes.” Id. at
1005.
The court then referenced the Department of Labor’s
interpretation that an employer’s duties under the WARN Act should
extend to employees whom the employer can logically expect “to
experience an employment loss.” Id. at 1006. The court further
reasoned “unless there is some evidence of imminent departure for
reasons other than the shutdown, it is unreasonable to conclude that
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employees voluntarily departed after receiving notice of the upcoming
closure.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “an employee departing a
business because that business was closing[] has not ‘voluntarily
departed’ within the meaning of the [WARN] Act.” Id. at 1008.
Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 630 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), “applicable [Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)] regulations preempt state tort law claims for
inadequate labeling against generic—as opposed to brand name—
manufacturers.” Id. at 1228.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated the Supreme Court’s decision in
Levine held “that the federal regulatory regime governing
pharmaceuticals does not preempt state law failure-to-warn claims
against brand name manufacturers.” Id. at 1228–30. In order to
determine whether Levine extended to generic drugs, the court conducted
a conflict preemption analysis. Id. at 1230–31. The court concluded that
“[c]ompliance with both state and federal law was not ‘impossible[]’”
because “the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)] provide[d]
generic manufacturers with at least three separate mechanisms by which
they can discharge their state-law duty to warn of additional risks
associated with their products.” Id. at 1231, 1239. The court next found
that the defendant “failed to present clear evidence that the FDA would
have rejected the specific . . . warnings proposed by the [plaintiffs].” Id.
at 1239. Finally, the court reasoned that “[a]dditional warnings would
not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that Levine “extends with equal
force to claims against generic manufacturers[,]” and thus “[t]he state
law duty to warn by an appropriate label on the generic . . . drug was not
preempted by federal law.” Id. at 1230, 1238–39.
Gonzales v. United States Dist. Court (In re Gonzales), 623 F.3d 1242
(9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “a capital habeas petitioner in district court
whose claims are entirely legal or record-based [and “can benefit from
communication between client and counsel”] is [therefore] entitled to a
stay pending a competency determination . . . .” Id. at 1244, 1247.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit reasoned that its prior decision in Nash
v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) governed this issue. Id. at 1244.
In Nash, the court held “the prosecution of a habeas appeal that is record-
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based and resolvable as a matter of law can benefit from communication
between client and counsel.” Id. It also found “the inquiry should be
whether rational communication with the [client] is essential to counsel’s
ability to meaningfully prosecute a capital habeas claim.” Id. at 1245
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court said that, in this case,
“communication with [the client] is essential . . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that claims of a capital habeas
petitioner in district court that are completely legal or record-based can
benefit from communication between the petitioner and counsel, and thus
a petitioner is “entitled to a stay pending a competency determination.”
Id. at 1244.
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.
2010)
QUESTION: Whether “tortious interference with contract is
preempted by the Copyright Act . . . .” Id. at 957.
ANALYSIS: The court said that “because contractual rights are not
equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright, the Copyright Act’s
preemption clause usually does not affect private contracts.” Id. The
court reasoned that a party may seek to “enforce contractual rights that
are not equivalent to any of its exclusive rights of copyright.” Id. The
court explained that its conclusion comports with decisions made in the
4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a “tortious interference
claim . . . is not preempted by the Copyright Act.” Id.
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Swift Transp. Co., 632 F.3d
1111 (9th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the disclosure and documentation
requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) require large carriers to disclose
“the complete methods by which such charges are calculated, including
documentation of their costs to third parties and profits realized.” Id. at
1116.
ANALYSIS: The court declared that the purpose of the regulation is
“to ensure that owner-operators have fair notice of any fees they will be
required to pay.” Id. at 1118. The court reasoned that “[d]isclosure of
the amounts owner-operators will be charged furthers this purpose of fair
notice . . . .” Id. The court observed a “complete disclosure of profits
and third-party costs is unnecessary to reach this goal.” Id. The court
finally stated the “controlling principle is that carriers must provide
sufficient information such that lessors can determine in advance what
their final costs will be.” Id. at 1120.
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CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that that, for variable fees that
“can be determined without disclosing . . . actual costs of profits . . . the
regulation does not require disclosure of how each component of the
price is calculated, except to the extent they are necessary to determine
the final price.” Id.
Parth v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether it is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) to change an employee’s schedule to accommodate
preferences while reducing the employee’s pay wage to that of the
former schedule. Id. at 797.
ANALYSIS: The court followed the Supreme Court’s precedent on
pre-FLSA pay plan alterations. Id. at 801. Citing the Supreme Court,
the court said that nothing in the FLSA prevents employers from
contracting with employees to pay them their previous wage rates, “so
long as the new rate equals or exceeds the minimum rate required by the
FLSA.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court
looked to the purpose of the FLSA, which is “to ensure that each
[covered] employee . . . would receive [a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work and would be protected from the evil of overwork as well as
underpay.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION: In finding that an employer can change the shift
schedule so as to accommodate employee preference, the 9th Circuit held
that an employer can reduce employee pay wages so that employees
receive the same wages they received under their former schedules;
however, the employer cannot reduce the rates to evade FLSA
provisions, including overtime pay. Id. at 797.
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether misdemeanor false imprisonment under
California Penal Code § 236 is a categorical crime of moral turpitude.
Id. at 626.
ANALYSIS: The court began by contrasting misdemeanor false
imprisonment with felony false imprisonment, noting that misdemeanor
false imprisonment is a general intent crime and does not require intent
to harm the victim. Id. at 625–26. The court then stated that the federal
generic definition of a crime of moral turpitude is “a crime involving
fraud or conduct that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and (2) violates
accepted moral standards.” Id. at 626. The court referred to its own past
decisions holding misdemeanor simple assault and simple driving under
the influence were not crimes of moral turpitude because of their absence
of intent. Id. at 626–27. The court also stated that California law
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requires a violation of another’s personal liberty to contain the elements
of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit in order to be considered a crime of
moral turpitude. Id. at 627.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that misdemeanor false
imprisonment is not a categorical crime of moral turpitude because it
does not require the defendant to have possessed an intent that would
make the crime “base, vile, or depraved.” Id. at 626.
United States v. Bush, 626 F.3d 527 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), defining “proceeds” for purposes of
18 U.S.C. § 1956, also “applies to a [§] 1957 transactional-moneylaundering conviction.” Id. at 529.
ANALYSIS: The court first reasoned that “[§§] 1956 and 1957
contain different elements, but have a common genesis[,]” and that the
discrepancies between the two sections do not “concern the usage or
meaning of ‘proceeds[.]’” Id. at 536. The court stated that “[b]oth
sections make explicit use of the word ‘proceeds,’ and since they were
enacted together in the Money Laundering Control Act, [it would] follow
the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court continued by noting
that “Santos and its progeny are less an examination of moneylaundering statutes and more an inquiry into the predicate crimes which
generate funds to be laundered.” Id. at 537. Finally, the court found that
because § 1957, unlike § 1956, lacks a knowledge requirement, limiting
the Santos decision might “allow the government to sidestep [the Santos]
holding by charging money laundering under [§] 1957.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “Santos applies with equal
force to transactions prosecuted under [§] 1957.” Id. at 536.
United States v. Diaz-Lopez, 625 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether “testimony that a search of a computer
database revealed no record of a matter violates the best evidence rule
when it is offered without the production of an ‘original’ printout
showing the search results.” Id. at 1201.
ANALYSIS: The court first stated the best evidence rule requires the
production of an original document instead of a copy. Id. The court then
examined the standard under Federal Rules of Evidence § 1002, which
states that “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
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court found that the Computer Linked Application Information
Management System (“CLAIMS”) database falls within the scope of the
best evidence rule because it is a writing or recording. Id. at 1202. The
court then looked to “whether the evidence was introduced ‘[t]o prove
the content of a writing, recording or photograph.’” Id. Because the
agent testified that the search returned no record, the court found that the
evidence was not introduced to prove its contents. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held the best evidence rule is
inapplicable to testimony regarding the search of a computer database
that revealed no record of a matter. Id. at 1203.
United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an applicable state’s failure to implement
[the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)]
precludes a federal prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender in
that state . . . .” Id. at 1128.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “SORNA requires states to
implement sex offender registries which comply with SORNA
requirements by July 2009 or lose part of their federal funding.” Id. The
court then stated that SORNA establishes a criminal offense for sex
offenders who do not register or update their registration. Id. The court
articulated that SORNA creates a “federal duty” on sex offenders to
register apart from any state obligations imposed on sex offenders and
irrespective of whether the state has adopted SORNA. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “without regard to whether
SORNA is implemented by [this] or any other state, registration under it
is required[,]” and a state’s failure to implement SORNA will not
preclude a federal prosecution for lack of registration.
Id.
United States v. Vela, 624 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction to review
cases in which a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
at 1151.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that appellate jurisdiction exists
when the trial court has rendered its “final judgment.” Id. at 1150–51.
The court said “finality coincides with the termination of the criminal
proceedings” and occurs when nothing is left “for the court to do but
execute the judgment.” Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court reasoned that generally “when a criminal defendant is found
guilty . . . it is only at sentencing that the criminal action terminates . . . .”
Id. The court concluded that when, as here, a jury finds a criminal
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, “the docketing of the verdict
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amounts to a final judgment because the criminal proceeding has come to
an end and no criminal sentence will follow.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the court retains its
appellate jurisdiction to review cases in which a criminal defendant is
found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 1152.
TENTH CIRCUIT
Chavez v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 621 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether, under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), a state education agency (“SEA”) must directly
provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to a student who
has been “home-schooled for a significant period of time because of
behaviors stemming from his autism and dropped from school rolls[]”
when the local educational agency (“LEA”) is not providing one. Id. at
1284–90.
ANALYSIS: The court construed the language of 20 U.S.C. §
1413(h) of the IDEA, which mandates an SEA to intervene and use
funds that would otherwise go to the LEA to directly provide a FAPE in
four situations. Id. at 1285. The court determined that none of the
situations applied to the facts of the case. Id. at 1286. The court found
that the SEA was not on notice of non-compliance at the local level and
therefore was not required “to take over education for the LEA . . . .” Id.
at 1289. Although the court conceded that “the IDEA centralizes
responsibility for assuring that the requirements of the Act are met in the
SEA . . . the IDEA is primarily a funding statute and the SEA controls
some of the purse strings.” Id. at 1287. If the SEA determines an LEA
does not deserve funds, it may not “simply yank funding” without giving
an LEA notice and a hearing. Id. at 1287–88. Finally, the court stated
that the SEA is not entirely free from culpability, as it is potentially
financially responsible for an LEA’s failure to comply with its
responsibilities, within the broad discretion of a district court. Id. at
1289.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held “that [the SEA] was not
required by the IDEA to provide educational services directly . . .” to a
student who was home-schooled for a lengthy period of time and
removed from school rolls. Id.
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Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the broker-dealer exemption of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”) applies to representatives who
sell a life insurance policy, or more generally, the application of the
broker-dealer exemption of the IAA. Id. at 1157–58.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “the IAA imposes fiduciary duties
on ‘investment advisers’” and that “‘[i]nvestment advisers’ include, in
relevant part, any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others . . . as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities.” Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court further stated that “[a]lthough the general definition of ‘investment
adviser’ is broad, it contains several specific exemptions.” Id. The court
found relevant in this case the “broker-dealer exemption,” which
“exempts brokers and dealers who give investment advice so long as
(1) the advice is solely incidental to their conduct as brokers or dealers,
and (2) they receive no special compensation for that advice.” Id. The
court explained: “[t]he two requirements are conjunctive; in order to be
exempted, broker-dealers must satisfy both.”
Id. at 1160–61.
Ultimately, the court found “that the phrase ‘solely incidental to’ means
‘solely attendant to’ or ‘solely in connection with,’ as opposed to ‘solely
a minor part of’ or ‘solely an insignificant part of.’” Id. at 1161. Thus,
“the applicability of the exemption depends not on the quantum or
importance of the broker-dealer’s advice, but rather on whether the
broker-dealer gives advice in connection with the sale of a product.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The court further said that this interpretation
comports with the language of the statute, the “legislative history and the
position taken by the [Securities and Exchange Commission].” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “the IAA excludes a
broker-dealer who provides advice that is attendant to, or given in
connection with, the broker-dealer’s conduct as a broker or dealer, so
long as he does not receive compensation that is (1) received specifically
in exchange for the investment advice, as opposed to for the sale of the
product, and (2) distinct from a commission or analogous transactionbased form of compensation for the sale of a product.” Id. at 1166.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “What procedures are sufficient to show that a debt
collector maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid errors that
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violate the [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692]?” Id. at 1273.
ANALYSIS: In considering whether the defendant-debt collector
presented sufficient evidence for the third prong of the “bona fide error
defense” pursuant to the FDCPA, the court articulated the two-step
analysis for the “procedures” component of the defense: first, “whether
the debt collector maintained . . . procedures to avoid errors[,]” and
second, “whether the procedures were reasonably adapted to avoid the
specific error at issue.” Id. at 1273–74 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Next, the court rejected a “definitive list of procedures,
or even universally applicable parameters[]” and found a question of
procedure to be a “fact sensitive inquiry.” Id. at 1274 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court continued to discuss the particular facts of the
case, and concluded the procedures component is a “uniquely fact-bound
inquiry[;]” therefore, the court “refrain[ed] from . . . sweeping
generalizations about what procedures would be enough for a debt
collector to effectively assert the defense.” Id. at 1277.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that questions of whether a
debt collector maintained procedure adapted to avoid errors are to be
resolved on a “case-by-case basis.” Id.
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Landstar Sys. Inc., 622 F.3d
1307 (11th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: Whether motor carriers can include administrative fees
“to make profits on charge-backs[]” without violating the Truth-inLeasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq. Id. at 1310, 1318.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the “Truth-in-Leasing
regulations are silent regarding a motor carrier’s ability to profit on
charge-backs.” Id. at 1318. The court stated “if a statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, [the] longstanding
practice is to defer to the executive department’s construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, unless the legislative
history of the enactment shows with sufficient clarity that the agency
construction is contrary to the will of Congress.” Id. The court further
reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) previously
“considered a prohibition on profits from charge-backs . . . but ultimately
rejected making it part of the final regulation. Id. at 1319.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that motor carriers “can profit
from charge-back items.” Id.
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Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing, sua sponte, a party’s complaint without first affording notice
or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1328.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that a district court can dismiss an
action sua sponte only if “the procedure employed is fair[,]” meaning it
provides the party with “notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity
to respond.” Id. at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
explained that there is an exception if reversal would be futile, such as a
complaint being unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss based on forum
non conveniens. Id. The court, relying on precedent regarding sua
sponte transfers, said it recognizes a “long-approved practice of
permitting a court to transfer a case sua sponte under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens . . . but only so long as the parties are first given
the opportunity to present their views on the issue.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that notice is required
despite district courts having greater discretion to transfer than to dismiss
on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the district court abused
its discretion because it failed to provide notice of its intent to dismiss or
an opportunity to be heard. Id.
United States v. Forey-Quintero, 626 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2010)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the phrase ‘begins to reside permanently in
the United States while under the age of eighteen years’ in former
[§] 321(a)(5) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)] allows an
alien to derive citizenship while in a status other than lawful permanent
resident status.” Id. at 1326.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the phrase “includes an implied
requirement that the [alien’s] residence be lawful.” Id. at 1327 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court declared “a dwelling place cannot
be ‘permanent’ under the immigration laws if it is unauthorized.” Id.
The court stated “requiring anything less than the status of lawful
permanent resident would essentially render the first clause of subsection
5 ‘mere surplusage.’” Id. The court’s logic comported with holdings
from the Board of Immigration Appeals and the 9th Circuit. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that former § 321(a)(5) of the
INA allows an alien to derive citizenship only if the alien is a lawful
permanent resident. Id.
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United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: Whether Amendment 732 to the commentary of U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) was a clarification
requiring retroactive application or a substantive change requiring
prospective application only. Id. at 1184.
ANALYSIS: The court said the guidelines originally applied to those
who “unduly influenced a minor to engage in prohibited sexual
conduct[,]” but Amendment 732 provided that “the undue influence
enhancement does not apply in a case in which the only minor . . .
involved in the offense is an undercover law enforcement officer.” and
Id. at 1183, 1184 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court stated
that several factors are relevant to whether an amendment enacts a
substantive change or simply clarifies the existing text. Id. at 1185. The
court said that “[a]n amendment that alters the text of the Guideline itself
suggests a substantive change[,]” while an amendment to the
commentary “suggests a clarification.” Id. at 1185. The court also stated
that the Sentencing Commission’s description of the amendment’s
purpose and the amendment’s inclusion on a list of retroactive
amendments should be considered. Id. Finally, the court observed that
an amendment that overturns existing circuit precedent suggests a
substantive change. Id. The court explained that the Sentencing
Commission enacted Amendment 732 to address a circuit split. Id. at
1186. The court also stated that that the amendment only altered the
commentary. Id. at 1187.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that Amendment 732 was a
clarifying amendment and should be applied retroactively. Id.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 2009-7044, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1559, 632 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
QUESTION: “Whether [38 U.S.C.] § 502 confers jurisdiction on the
court to review a denial by Secretary of a petition for rulemaking[.]” Id.
at *2.
ANALYSIS: The court first observed that § 502 subjects the actions
of the Secretary, when dealing within § 553(e) under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), to judicial review. Id. at *6–7. The court said that
the APA governs the procedures agencies must follow for rule making,
and it focused on the “notice-and-comment” requirements. Id. at *7–8.
The court then stated that an “[a]gency’s failure to comply with notice-
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and-comment procedures, when required, is grounds for invalidating a
rule.” Id. at *11–12. The court expressed concern that with judicial
power to ensure procedural compliance but no power for review of the
decision, a remedial gap would result; this could not have been
Congress’s intent. Id. at *17–19.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that “§ 502 vests [the
court] with jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s denial of a request for
rulemaking made pursuant to § 553(e).” Id. at *18.

